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Ward Ford and Rude: ANCSA

ANCSA: SOVEREIGNTY AND A JUST
SETTLEMENT OF LAND CLAIMS OR AN ACT
OF DECEPTION
'

Marilyn J. Ward Ford* and Robert Rude *

A.

LAND CLAIMS

Over the last two decades, many comments have appeared in
newspaper editorial pages condemning the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act' (ANCSA) as a gift of land and money to the
Natives of Alaska. Contrary to these reports, ANCSA was not a
gift to Natives of Alaska, it was a settlement of aboriginal land
Pursuant to ANCSA, Alaska Natives were granted
rights.
44,000,000 acres of land and nearly $1 billion for extinguishment
of their aboriginal land rights to all of Alaska.

* Marilyn J. Ward Ford is a Professor of Law at Quinnipiac College School
of Law. In addition to teaching Native American Law, Professor Ford has
The author
litigated cases with and on behalf of Native Americans.
acknowledges the valuable assistance of her research assistant, Keith
Blumenstock, and her secretary, Suzanne Passander, in the preparation of this
article.
** Robert W. Rude, a Native Alaskan, was appointed a representative for
the unorganized interior Alaskan villages at the first meeting of the Alaska
Federation of Natives in 1966. In 1970, he was elected to the Board of
Directors of the Cook Inlet Native Association (CINA) and became President
in 1972 and helped move CINA into the mainstream of Indian selfdetermination.
After the passage of ANCSA in 1971, Robert Rude was a founding member
of Cook Inlet Region, Inc., and in 1972 was elected Second Vice President.
In his many years of service, -Robert Rude has served on AFN's Human
Resource Committee, was President of CIRI's Foundation, Cook Inlet Tribal
Council, and of the Southcentral Foundation.
143 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629(e) (1988).
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ANCSA is inconsistent with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,2
a piece of legislation which recognized Indian tribes as "distinct,
independent political communities" with inherent sovereignty and
rightful possession of their land.
The Northwest Ordinance was enacted by the First Congress in
1789 and declared:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards
Indians; their land and property shall never be taken
from them without their consent, and in their property
rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or
disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by
congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall
from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being
done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship

with them.3
Prior to the adoption of ANCSA-and even prior to the
purchase of Alaska by the United States, Native Alaskans
possessed, used, occupied and claimed the territory as their
ancestral land.4 Although the purchase of Alaska from Russia

was formalized in the Treaty Concerning the Cession of Russian
Possessions in North America5 on March 30, 1867, and reference
2 Northwest Ordinance
3 Id. at 52.
4 Note that there were

of 1787, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).

never any treaties between the United States and the
Native groups in Alaska designating lands that the Native Alaskans were
entitled to possess and occupy.
I Treaty Concerning the Cession of Russian Possessions in North America,
March 30, 1867, U.S.-Russia, 15 Stat. 539 (1867). The Treaty of Cession did
not directly address the issue of Alaska Native's legal rights to the land.
Article 3 of the Treaty indirectly dealt with the issue by providing that "the
uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United
States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that
country . . . ." Id. at 542. This provision made Alaska Natives subject to
policies adopted for "aboriginal tribes." But the United States and the future
of Alaska Natives would be tied to those of the American Indian. Id. See also
Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947) (holding that the Treaty
of Cession did not extinguish aboriginal title to all Native people in Alaska).
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was made to Native land claims in that Act as well as in the
Organic Act of 18846 which established a civil government for the
Alaskan territory, the issue of Native Alaskan legal rights to the
land was not resolved by either statute. In fact, Section 8 of the

Organic Act specifically postponed resolution of the issue and
reserved it for future action by Congress.'

The Alaska Native

Allotment Act of 19068 provided for the allotment of homesteads
of up to 160 acres of nonmineral land, but it also failed to resolve
the issue of Native Alaskan land claims. Aboriginal land claims

were acknowledged, but again the issue of Native Alaskan rights
was left unresolved by the Alaska Statehood Act of 19589 in
which the United States government directed Alaska to select

102,500,000 acres of federal lands which were "vacant,
unappropriated, and unreserved at the time of their selection.'o
6 The

Organic Act for Alaska of 1884, Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat.

24 (1884) (providing for a civil government as well as extending United States
mining laws to Alaska).
' Section 8 of the Organic Act of 1884 provides as follows:
That the Indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed in the
possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by
them but the terms under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is
reserved for future legislation by Congress. See id. § 8 at 26. The statute was
apparently intended to provide security to "non-Indians who had pioneered in
Alaska" but its "effect on aboriginal title, however, has never been certain."
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 742 (Rennard
Strickland & Charles F. Wilkins eds., Michie 1982); See United States v.
Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442,444 (1905) (interpreting the Act to provide protection
for Native Alaskan's right of occupancy); But see Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278 (1955) (ruling that rather than recognizing
the Indians right of ownership, the Act simply maintained the status quo). The
Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians reasoned that "careful examination" of
the statute and legislative history indicate no congressional intent "to grant to
the Indians any permanent rights in the lands in Alaska occupied by them." Id.
8 Alaska Native -Allotment Act, May 17, 1906, Ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197
(1906).
9
Id. (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 21 (1994).
10 See id. § 6(b). See also Section 4 of the Statehood Act pursuant to which
the State of Alaska disclaimed any right or title to "any lands or other
property... the right or title to which may be held by an Indians, Eskimos,
or Aleuts ...or held by the United States in trust for said natives." See id.

§ 4.
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The intent was to "provide the new State with a solid economic
foundation."" Despite the fact that the Alaska Statehood Act
acknowledged Native Alaskans' right to lands used and occupied
by them, it provided no definition or criteria for such use or
occupancy.
In 1959 the Alaska Court of Claims ruled that the Tlingits and
Haidas had established use and occupancy to the lands and waters
of virtually all of Southeastern Alaska,12 and they were entitled to
compensation for "all usable and accessible land which they used
and occupied."1 3 A year earlier, under the Statehood Act, the
State of Alaska had been given a land grant of 103,000,000 acres.
When the State of Alaska began selecting lands near villages,
Alaska Natives felt threatened. Alaskan Natives who claimed
aboriginal title to over 365,000,000 acres of land in Alaska,
virtually the entire state, 4 protested the early selections made by
the State of Alaska under the Statehood Act.' 5 The Natives'
claims to most of the state raised the issue of what, if any land, in
Alaska was available for selection by the state under the
Statehood Act.16
Frustrated, frightened, and angered by the threat of state
selection of aboriginal lands, Alaska Natives filed claims with the
" See U.S. v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1015 (D. Alaska
1977); See also H.R. REP. No. 92-523, at 4 (1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.A. 2192 and 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2933, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
12 Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 452
(Ct. Cl. 1959).
13 After nine years, the court placed a value of $7,546,053.80 on the 16
million acres taken by the government. Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska v.
United States, 389 F.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
14 See COHEN, supra note 7, at 198 (citing Lazarus & West, The Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act: A Flawed Victory, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
132 (1976)); See also ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS 119
(1976). By May of 1967, thirty-nine protests had been filed. Id. They ranged
in size from a 640-acre claim by the village of Chilkoot to the 58 million-acre
claim of the Arctic Slope Native Association. Id. Because many claims were
overlapping, the total acreage under protest -- about 380 million acres -- was

greater than the land area of the state. Id.
15COHEN, supra note 7, at 742.
16 Id.
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Department of the Interior to protect their aboriginal land rights. 7
On January 12, 1967, Stewart Udall, the Secretary of the Interior
imposed a "land freeze"-moratorium-on the transfer of title to
public land to the State of Alaska until the issue of native land
claims was resolved.' 8 The potential loss of lands near Native
communities was the issue that brought Alaska Natives together,
and it was what led to the formation of Native organizations
throughout the state.
In June 1966, a charter of 25 members of the Cook Inlet Native
Association flew from Anchorage to Barrow to meet with Arctic
Slope Native Association members. The Barrow meeting set the
stage for the first statewide Native meeting in October 1966. The
first statewide Alaska Native conference was held in Anchorage,
Alaska. The October 1966 meeting was called to organize Alaska
Natives so that they could begin to fight for their land rights.
From the mid-1960's to the early 1970's, the Alaska Federation
of Natives ("AFN") was the main lobbyist for an Alaskan Native

"7The existence of Native claims to most of the state raised the question of
what, if any lands were available for state selection under the terms of the
statute. Because Natives protested most of the state's early selections, the
Secretary of the Interior, on January 12, 1969, imposed a freeze on further
patenting or approval of applications for public lands in Alaska pending the
settlement of Native claims. Pursuant to Public Land Order No. 4582 the
freeze was scheduled to expire on midnight December 31, 1970, 34 Fed.Reg.
1025 (1969). The effect of the moratorium was to freeze the appropriation and
disposition of all public lands in Alaska that were unreserved prior to the
expiration of the order, including selection by the State of Alaska under the
Statehood Act. See U.S. v. Atlantic Richfield at 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1017 (D.
Alaska 1977). See also COHEN, supra note 7, at 742.
18 ARNOLD, supra note 14, at 117. See also United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 449 U.S. 888 (1980):
In the face of Federal guarantee that the Alaska Natives shall not be
disturbed in the use and occupation of lands, I could not in good
conscience allow title to pass into others' hands. . .. Moreover, to

permit others to acquire title to the lands the Natives are using and
occupying would create an adversary against whom the Natives
would not have the means of protecting themselves.
ARNOLD, supra note 14, at 118 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Udall).
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land claims settlement. 19 AFN placed many of their views into

the legislation that eventually emerged from Congress in
ANCSA.
AFN publicly advocated a settlement that would
protect aboriginal rights, preserve Alaskan Native culture, and
bring self-determination -to Alaskan Natives.

AFN leadership

repeatedly emphasized that land and aboriginal rights were more
important than money, however, it was reported that AFN
reluctantly supported a land settlement of 60 million acres,
$500,000,000 and a perpetual 2% royalty from the State of

Alaska for resource revenues. 20 Leadership at AFN supported the
use of a corporate structure of land ownership by Alaska Natives
instead of the reservation system that was used by lower "48"
Indians.
The issue of land claims - aboriginal right and entitlement to
land in Alaska - was not resolved until 1971 when Congress
adopted ANCSA.
Although ANCSA did not specifically

recognize Native Alaskans' aboriginal land claims, it finally
resolved all disputes based on them by retroactively extinguishing
aboriginal title. 2' ANCSA retroactively extinguished any and all
'9The fight to secure a land claims settlement for Alaska Natives was
financed by the Yakima Indians of Washington and Tyonek Natives loaned
AFN $100,000. Id.
20 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANCSA 1985 Study, (June 29, 1984)
(unpublished draft). The 1985 ANCSA Study states that Native corporations
at the regional and village levels would manage the settlement for the benefit
of Alaska Natives and their descendants. The regional corporations' charters
were to authorize them to undertake projects to promote the health, welfare,
education, economic, and social well-being of their shareholders. Id.
21 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (a) (b) (c). See U.S. v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 F. Supp.
1009 (D. Alaska 1977), where the United States on behalf of itself and Arctic
Slope Eskimos, sued the State of Alaska and 140 corporations and individuals
for trespass on aboriginal lands prior to the adoption of ANCSA. Id. at 1013.
In rendering its decision, the federal District Court for the District of Alaska
emphasized that in Alaska, "unlike the Lower 48, there were never any
treaties between the United States and Alaska Native groups designating lands
which Natives were entitled to occupy or defining their rights to the taking of
fish and game." Id. at 1015. It then quoted ANCSA's declaration that all
"prior conveyance of public land ...and all tentative approvals ... shall be
regarded as an extinguishment of the aboriginal title thereto, if any;" that "all
aboriginal titles, if any ... are hereby extinguished;"
that "all
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Native claims against the United States, the State of Alaska, and
other persons that were "based on aboriginal right, title, use or
occupancy of land" in Alaska. 22 It did not expressly provide for

any land to be conveyed to the state of Alaska; however, by
implication, the passage of ANCSA permitted the State to resume

its selection of land which had been interrupted by Secretary
Udall's imposition of the land freeze. "23
B.

ANCSA ENACTED

The discovery of oil in Alaska's Prudoe Bay in 1969 - and
construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline-provided the impetus
for adoption of ANCSA and legislative resolution of the issue of
native Alaskan land claims. 24 Oil companies were extremely
claims... based on claims of aboriginal right, title, use or occupancy... are
hereby extinguished." Id. at 1022. In holding that tort claims had been
extinguished by ANCSA, the court reasoned that "aboriginal title," as
distinguished from "Indian title recognized by treaty or reservation, is legally
extinguished when the United States makes an otherwise lawful conveyance of
land pursuant to federal statute." Id. at 1020 (quoting U.S. v. Gemmill, 535
F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976)). Based on this reasoning, the court ruled that
ANCSA retroactively extinguished Alaska Natives' aboriginal title. It held
that "congressional intent was to make clear that any prior grant of land under
federal law or tentative approval under ...the Statehood Act operated to
extinguish aboriginal title at the time the conveyance was made or the approval
given." d. at 1023.
' See Atlantic Richfield, 435 F. Supp. at 1022. Retroactive extinguishment
was emphasized by the court which ruled that "all aboriginal titles and claims
in Alaska based on use and occupancy are hereby extinguished" and that the
unmistakable intent of Subsection 4(a) is not only to validate prior conveyances
of public land in Alaska, including tentative approvals of State land selections
under the Statehood Act, but to dispel any doubt that aboriginal title to such
lands was extinguished at the time of tentative approval or conveyance. Id. at
1022.
2 See ARNOLD, supra note 14, at 272.
24 "The resolution of Native claims in Alaska was expedited by pressure
from the state and from oil companies wishing to exploit the state's newly
discovered petroleum resources. Oil development and transportation
could not progress so long as such claims and rights clouded state
authority to lease lands and transfer rights to the companies, as well as
the ability of the federal government to authorize construction of the
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anxious to commence oil drilling operations in order to extract
the "black gold" found in Alaska but they declined to do so until
Native Alaskans' claims to the land had been extinguished;
pressure from the oil companies to resolve the outstanding issue
of aboriginal land claims and to expedite the commencement of
oil drilling operations in Alaska led to the adoption of ANCSA.
Pursuant to ANCSA, title to approximately 40 million acres of
federal public land was indirectly conveyed to Alaskan NativesIndians, Eskimos, and Aleuts; 26 the Alaskan natives were
awarded $962.5 million;27 and all Native Alaskans' land claims

were retroactively extinguished.28 Ostensibly, Congress adopted
the legislation to effectuate a "fair and just settlement of
Trans-Alaska Pipeline, necessary to transport the oil. Passage of
ANCSA in 1971 cleared these obstacles and implicitly recognized the
validity of prior Native claims by its careful extinguishment of all
aboriginal rights and claims based upon them." See COHEN, supra note
7, at 742.
25 43 U.S.C. 1601-1629(e) (1988). ANCSA created a complex corporate
mechanism for Native selection, administration, and development of land in
Alaska. It provided for the creation of twelve regional corporations and for
the establishment of Native corporations and for title to forty million acres of
land to be selected by Native villages and the regional corporations. ANCSA
also provided for the expenditure, investment, and distribution of an Alaska
Native Fund of $462.5 million in congressional appropriations and another
$500 million of oil royalties. 43 U.S.C. 1611, 1613(h) (1986).
26 See 43 U.S.C. §§
1611, 1613 (1986).
27 See id § 1605.
28 See id §§ 1611, 1613.
Pursuant to ANCSA, shares of stock in the
ANCSA corporations were non-alienable and could not be transferred to nonNatives until after December 18, 1991. See 43 U.S.C. 1606(h). Under 1988
and 1991 ANCSA Amendments, (Pub. L. No. 102-201, Sec. 301, 105 Stat.
1633 (1991)) the restrictions on transfer of the stock to non-Natives was lifted
on December 18, 1991, the date when all stock originally issued to Natives in
Regional and village corporations was canceled and new shares were issued.
The new shares are freely transferable unless the corporations amended their
articles prior to December 18, 1991 to restrict alienation to non-Natives. In
those cases where the articles were not amended, Native corporation stock as
well as actual control of the corporations themselves could be taken away from
the Native Alaskans and conveyed to non-Natives who would not only own the
land but also establish policy for the corporations. See COHEN, supra note 7,
at 757.
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aboriginal land claims" and to finally resolve the outstanding
issue regarding the legal rights of eighty thousand Native
Alaskans to the land they used, occupied, and claimed title to."°
Rather than simply conveying ancestral lands directly to the
Natives, Congress set up regional corporations to distribute the
land and assist Native corporations to receive and administer the
lands for the benefit of Native Alaskans who would become
stockholders in the Native corporations. Pursuant to ANCSA,
Native Alaskans were entitled to enroll and become shareholders"0
in a regional corporation and in one of over two hundred Native
village corporations; enrollment was determined according to the
Natives' place of residence or origin.
The relevant provision of ANCSA states that "if the village had
on 1970 census enumeration date a Native population between

The House Report on ANCSA's proposed settlement plan implies that it
was intended to be a fair and just settlement of aboriginal land claims. It
states, in relevant part, that:
[i]t has been the consistent policy of the United States Government
in its dealings with Indian tribes to grant them title to a portion of
the lands which they occupied, to extinguish the aboriginal title to
the remainder of the lands by placing such lands in the public
domain, and to pay the fair value of the titles extinguished. This
procedure was initiated by treaties in the earlier part of our history,
and was completed by enactment of the Indian Claims Commission
Act of 1946.
H.R. REP. NO. 523 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.A.N 2192-94.
30 See id. § 1611.
Pursuant to ANCSA, shares of stock in the ANCSA
corporations were non-alienable and could not be transferred to non-Natives
until after December 18, 1991. See id. § 1606(h). Under 1980 and 1991
ANCSA Amendments the restrictions on transfer of the stock to non-Natives
was lifted on December 18, 1991, the date when all stock originally issued to
Natives in Regional and village corporations was canceled and new shares
were issued. See Pub. L. No. 102-201, Sec. 301, Dec. 10, 1991, 105 Stat.
1633 (1991). The new shares are freely transferable unless the corporations
amended their articles prior to December 18, 1991 to restrict alienation to nonNatives. In those cases where the articles were not amended, Native
corporation stock as well as actual control of the corporations themselves could
be taken away from the Native Alaskans and conveyed to non-Natives who
would not only own the land but also established policy for the corporations.
See COHEN, supra note 7, at 757.
29
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2531 and 99, it shall be entitled to a patent to an area of public
lands equal to 69,120 acres. 3 2 The corporations were directed to
select land for their use in twelve geographic regions and within
the vicinity of the Native villages and the corporations were given
responsibility for administration of their portion of the Alaska
Native Fund and distribution of funds to the Native
shareholders. 3
Ending the land freeze imposed by the Secretary of the Interior
and the building of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline both influenced
Congress to approve a settlement of Alaska Native land claims.
In late 1971, Congress approved ANCSA, a bill that included
962.5 million dollars and 40 million acres of land to settle the
Alaska Native Claims.35 President Nixon agreed to withhold his
signature from the legislation until AFN met and voted on the
bill.
AFN called a statewide meeting at Alaska Pacific University in
Anchorage on December 18, 1971 to vote on the bill. The
legislation was endorsed by the leadership of AFN which agreed
that the bill was the best Alaska Natives could get at the time.
Robert Rude attended the AFN meeting that approved ANCSA
as a voting delegate for the Cook Inlet Native Association
("CINA"), and Robert Rude voted with other delegates to
approve the legislation. Arctic Slope delegates were not in favor
of the legislation and they voted against it. The ANCSA
legislation was approved by AFN delegates by a 511 to 56 vote.
A special telephone relay advised President Nixon of the vote.
Robert Rude reported that the delegates were standing motionless
3"Cohen, supra note 7, at 740.
43 U.S.C. 1613(b), (1986).
33 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1613 (1986).
35 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629(e) (1986). ANCSA created a complex corporate
32

mechanism for Native selection, administration, and development of land in
Alaska. It provided the creation of twelve regional corporations and for the
establishment of Native corporations and for title to forty million acres of land
to be selected by Native villages and the regional corporations. ANCSA also
provided for the expenditure, investment, and distribution of an Alaska Native
Fund of $462.5 million in congressional appropriations and another $500
million of oil royalties. 43 U.S.C. § 1611, 163(h) (1986).
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and quiet when the President said, "I want you to be among the
first to know that I have signed the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act."
After the President finished his statement there was applause
and the delegates started congratulating each other. Attendants at
the meeting were overjoyed, and most delegates viewed ANCSA
as a victory for their people. Like many other delegates, Robert
Rude thought ANCSA would bring land and money to the Native
Alaskan people, and that it would provide a means to improve the
living conditions of a people basically living in poverty.
ANCSA did not provide wealth, land, or improvement in the
lifestyles of Alaska Natives. Instead it divided Alaska Natives,
placed their lands and culture in jeopardy, and only brought
worthwhile wealth and benefit to corporate consultants, lawyers,
managers, employees, and directors.
Many Native Alaskans view ANCSA as an act of deception-an
act destined for failure. They assert that ANCSA was designed
to assimilate Alaska Natives into the mainstream of American
society and divested them of their land, culture, heritage-and
ultimately their inherent tribal sovereignty.

C.

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIAN COUNTRY

In a statement to Native Americans and non-Natives gathered to
discuss the scope of Indian country and inherent Native
sovereignty, Patrice H. Kunesh, an attorney for the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal nation stated that
[t]he reverence American Indians hold for the
sovereignty of their tribal governments is tremendous.
Certainly this respect equals that possessed by all
Americans for the freedoms [e]mbraced in the [United
States] Constitution ....
Sovereignty is a powerful word that conveys in its
interpretation the baggage of centuries of human
emotion. Originally referring to the absolute power of
kings over their subjects-the king could do no wrong..
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Much of the understanding regarding tribal
sovereignty stems from the mistaken idea that it is a gift
granted by the federal government to American Indian
tribes.
The reality is that American Indian tribes and tribal
governments existed long before.. . the framers of the
[United States] Constitution were born.
American Indian sovereignty encompasses inherent
rights and powers that have been retained by Native
nations and not specifically abridged by the federal
government.36
Native American tribes have begun to reassert inherent
sovereignty in recent years. As sovereign nations inhabiting
Indian country, tribes have chosen to "simply exercis[e]
their . . . rights" and "make money from their right to tax
business ventures" on their lands as well as pursuing
The funds raised from taxes or
entrepreneurial activities.
entrepreneurial activities have allowed tribes to make "striking
advances on numerous reservations" and support fire stations,
health clinics, education, housing, employment, and other
programs that have "dramatically improved the lives" of Native
Americans. 38
According to many Native Americans, the "efforts of American
Indians to improve their standard of living for themselves and
their children requires the freedom to employ their innate
sovereignty," which is "not a weapon but an inherent
characteristic and vehicle that can transport" Native Americans
from "dependency to self-sufficiency. 39 As stated by Ms.
Kunesh, not only does sovereignty symbolize freedom, it also
enhances important revenue sources that "many tribes have used
to raise themselves out of poverty. 4°
36

Patricia H. Kunesh, Address at the Conference on Native American

Sovereignty, Quinnipiac College School of Law (October 24, 1997).
37
38

39
40

Id.
id.

id.
id.
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1. Legislative and Judicial Determination of Indian County
The term Indian Country "was first used by Congress in 1790
to describe the territory controlled by Indians." 4 1 In 1948,
Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which defines Indian
country as "(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation
•... I(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States . . ., and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
42
titles to which have not been extinguished. "
Two United States Supreme Court cases established the basis of
the dependent Indian community component of the 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 definition of Indian country. In the first case, United
States v. Sandoval,43 the Court created the "dependent Indian
communities" test 4 and held that the federal government has the
power to enact laws for the benefit and protection of all
"dependent Indian communities within the geographical limits of
the United States." 45 In arriving at its decision, the Court stated
that:
[n]ot only does the Constitution expressly authorize
Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, but
long continued legislative and executive usage and an
unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to
the United States ... the duty of exercising a fostering
care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within or
without the limits of a state.46

41 STEVEN C. PEvAR, RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES

16 (1992), (citing Act
of July 22, 1970, cl. 31, 1 Stat. 136, 136).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)
43 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
44 Id. at 47 (basing congressional guardianship over "dependent Indian
communities" on the existence of "Indian lineage, isolated and communal life.
primitive
customs and limited civilization.").
45
Id. at 46.
46
Id. at 45-46.
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In United States v. McGowan," the second case on which
Congress relied when enacting section 1151(b), the Court used
the "dependent Indian community" test set forth in Sandoval to
determine whether an Indian "colony" was Indian country and
subject to regulation by the federal government.48 In dismissing
form over substance, the court found that "the protection of a
dependent people" was the "fundamental consideration of both
Congress and the Department of the Interior" in establishing the
colony and that Native Americans in the colony had been
"afforded the same protection by the government" that had been
provided to Native Americans in other settlements known as
"reservations. "'9 The Court held that a dependent Indian
community is Indian country and that Indian country exists
wherever any land has been "'set apart for the use of Indians as
50
such under the superintendence of the [federal] [g]overnment."'
After the enactment of section 1151(b), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that a dependent Indian community is Indian country.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band PotawatomiIndian
Tribe of Oklahoma,5" the Court held that "the test for determining
whether land is Indian country does not turn upon whether that
land is denominated 'trust land' or a 'reservation.' Rather, we
ask whether the area has been 'validly set apart for the use of the
Indians as such, under the superintendence of the

[g]overnment. "'52
2. Legislative and Judicial Recognition of Inherent Tribal
Sovereignty
The Supreme Court first recognized inherent tribal sovereignty
in Worcester v. Georgia,53 holding there that Indian nations were
47 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
48 Id. at 538-39.
49
Id. at 538.
5oId. at 539 (quoting United

States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 450 (1914)).

5'498 U.S. 505 (1991).

Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978)
(citations omitted)).
52

13

31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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"distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
The
original natural rights... from time immemorial."'
doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty was later reaffirmed by the
Court in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Bank Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,5 United States v. Wheeler"5 and
Merrion v. JicarillaApache TribeY
Prior to the arrival of Columbus in 1492 - even prior to the
adoption of the United States Constitution - Native Americans
had inherent tribal sovereignty as well as Indian title to the
territory they had long possessed, used, and occupied as their
ancestral land. They had the right to occupy their ancestral
homelands until that right was extinguished by Congress. 5'
Indian title is the right of occupancy. 9 The loss of Indian titlethe right to use, occupy, or possess land - does not affect
sovereignty of tribes.6°
Tribal sovereignty is authorized under the IRA, 6 ' in
which Congress provided that [an] Indian tribe shall have
the right to organize for its common welfare, and may
adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, and any
amendments thereto, which shall become effective when
(1) ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of
the tribe or tribes at a special election authorized and
called by the Secretary under such rules and regulations

541d.

at 559.

51 498 U.S. at 509 (noting that suits against Indian tribes are barred by
sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional
abrogation).
56 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (noting that powers of Indian tribes, including
the power to enforce criminal laws against tribe members, are inherent).
455 U.S. 130, 140-1 (1982) (concluding that a tribe's authority to tax nonIndians who conduct business on the reservation is an inherent power
necessary to self-government).
58 See
59

60
61

PEVAR, supra note 41, at 20-21.
See id. at 21.

See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (1994).
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as the Secretary may prescribe: and (2) approved by the
Secretary pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. 62
The IRA also provides that "[i]n addition to all powers vested
in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or
its tribal council the following rights and powers:
To

.

. negotiate

with

the

[f]ederal,

[s]tate

and

local

governments. "63
In 1993, acting pursuant to the authority delegated to it by
Congress, the Department of the Interior published a list of
Alaska Native Villages that were federally recognized as Indian
tribes with inherent sovereignty, that possessed the same status as
tribes in the lower forty-eight states, and that "functioned as
political entities exercising governmental authority."6
The
Department of the Interior emphasized that the purpose of the
publication was to "expressly and unequivocally acknowledge"
that Alaska Native Villages and regional tribes included on the
list were recognized as "political entities exercising governmental
authority" and retained their inherent sovereign authority. 6 It
stated that:
[b]y

the time

of enactment

of the

IRA

...

the

preponderant opinion was that Alaska Natives were
subject to the same legal principles as Indians in the
contiguous [forty-eight] states, and had the same powers
and attributes as other Indian tribes. .

.

. The purpose of

the current publication is to publish an Alaska list of
entities conforming to the intent of 25 CFR 83.6(b) and
to eliminate any doubt as to the Department's intention
by expressly and unequivocally acknowledging that the

62 Id.
63 Id.

§ 476(e).

6 Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the

United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54, 364 54, 365 (1993).
65 Id. at 54, 365.
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Department has determined that the villages and regional
tribes listed below are distinctly Native communities and
have the same status as tribes in the contiguous [fortyeight] states.6
In December 1997, in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government,67 the United States Supreme Court heard
arguments concerning whether or not Indian country and inherent
tribal sovereignty survived ANCSA and continued to exist in
Alaska and, if so, whether the Venetie inhabit Indian country. 63
The outcome of this decision was of utmost importance to the
Venetie tribe and other Native American tribes that cherish their
inherent Native sovereignty. 69 The battle for sovereigntyfreedom and revenue enhancement-for at least one tribe of
Native Americans, the Venetie, ended unsuccessfully on
February 25, 1998 when the Court held that the Venetie Tribe's
land was not Indian Country and its inherent tribal sovereignty
did not survive ANSCA.

66 Id. at 54, 365-66.
67 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).

The Court held Venetie Tribe's land was not
Indian Country since it did not satisfy the two prong requirement for Indian
Country. Indian Country only refers to a limited category of Indian lands that
are neither reservations nor allotments. It must be set aside by Federal
Government for use of Indians and it must be under federal superintendence.
Id. at 950.
6 id.
69
rd.
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